the Chinese Government obviously wished to avoid. Thus did mortality and diplomacy confront each other in Manchuria during 1910-1911. In need of medical help, but needing also to fend off growing political and military pressures, the Imperial Chinese Government at first requested assistance and then called for an International Plague Conference, a step unprecedented in China's history. Richard Pearson Strong became the chief United States delegate to the conference which was held in Manchuria at Mukden in April 1911, 3 and his three-month stay in China brought him into prominence. How Strong came to be involved, what he accomplished, and what followed from those accomplishments, are the subjects of this essay.
THE MANCHURIAN EPIDEMIC, I9IO-I9II: AN OVERVIEW 4
The accepted if somewhat imprecisely documented reservoir of the epidemic was the tarbagan 5 (fr. Russian, sometimes spelled tarabagan; in English, the marmot [Arctomys bobac, now Marmota sibirica]; in Chinese, hant'a), a cat-sized, burrowing rodent hunted mainly for its pelt, much valued in the European market where some two million skins annually were processed to resemble sable and marten. The indigenous Mongol and Buriat hunters avoided taking sick-looking (plague-infected) marmots, but when the price of pelts soared from twelve to seventy-two cents US, 6 many inexperienced Chinese came from the Central Provinces to Manchuria as trappers and proved careless about handling the marmots, sick or well. While marmots were reservoirs of plague, and were circumstantially linked to infection of humans, it is problematical how the first human case originated at Manchouli, ten miles from the Sino-Siberian border (Figure i ), in October 1910, and it is also uncertain why that index case should have turned pneumonic. At all events, the epidemic that evolved from it was pneumonic; bubonic plague never appeared in people or in rats.
With the onset of cold weather, the ten thousand hunters, along with many thousands more migrant agricultural laborers, began the annual journey homeward to the South. The men were traveling after completing their seasonal work, to avoid the bitter cold of the Manchurian winter (minus 3O°F was common), and to reach home for the Chinese New Year, a holiday important to family and ancestor worship. Manchuria, with a land-mass of some 360,000 square miles, boasted three railways (Figure 1 ) along which most of the "coolie" laborers moved: one line was owned and operated by the Russians, a second by the Japanese, and the third by the Chinese; the Russians and Japanese also controlled large "conceded" territories and towns abutting their lines. The epidemic clearly followed the rail routes, and wherever men gathered in railway carriages or rested in overcrowded inns, sleeping "packed like sardines," 7 plague flourished and men died, frequently a day or two after sickening. 8 The corpses lay unburied, some in coffins stacked on the deep-frozen ground, or were thrown into pits blasted with dynamite; later in the epidemic, cremation was permitted despite popular repugnance. 9 Manchurian hospitals and staff were unequal to caring for the plague victims. There was no public health organization, little or no local expertise, no safe way to handle patients or corpses, and no therapeutic help from traditional Chinese or Western medicine. The epidemic began to decline in January-February, owing mainly to administrative measures that controlled personal and population movements, 10 and perhaps also (as some later argued) because the weather moderated.
7. Gray, (n. 4) p. 1158. 8. Pneumonic plague tended to spare females, infants, die old, and the wealthy. The incubation period was diree to five days, followed by sudden fever, chills, headache, lassitude, and rapid pulse. A day later productive coughing began and die sputum turned bloody. Death came quickly thereafter, probably of respiratory insufficiency and endotoxin shock.
9. The decision to use cremation, however, did not come until die Imperial Government was pressed to it in January 1911, by which time some 2,000 frozen corpses had accumulated, unburied, outside Harbin alone. See Wu Lien-Teh, (n. 4) p. 29.
10. The administrative controls included: military cordons around certain towns; die division of towns into segments between which travel was regulated; die development of plague hospitals and of quarantine or isolation units, the latter usually in heated railway freight cars; selective restrictions on rail travel; and cremation of the dead. See, for example, Gray, (n. 4) p. 1157 rt seq. Local peoples evolved their own techniques: the Buriats, for example, "sew a patient in his tent and no one goes near it until die smoke goes out," according to Farrar, (n. 4) p. 23. On a grander scale, the Japanese were said to have considered controlling population movement by "stretching a live wire across the whole [Dairen] 32 Calhoun replied that the Chinese were willing to "place a policy for £ 1000 for six months for each representative, if any company will issue the policy." Alternatively, in the event of deaths, the Chinese would indemnify the families in the amount of about $6,500.
33 (Strong was then thirty-eight and married but childless; Teague was thirty-two and single.) It is unclear whether the two men were ever insured against the hazards of Manchuria, although a dispatch in the New York Times asserted that the Peking Government is "insuring each foreign volunteer for Szo.ooo." Last evening I called at Foreign Office to inquire when and where the plague experts were to be received and what plan for their investigations, if any, had been formulated. I was surprised with the information that the authorities here did not wish experts to arrive until April third. It was also stated that they were not expected to treat cases of the plague or to expose themselves to the disease. They were to form a sort of a medical council and to make such a general condition investigation as would enable them to suggest preventative measures, treatment, remedies, etc. I complained that no notice had been given me of this plan. The reply was that each of the Chinese Ministers in the countries to which invitations were extended had already been notified by cable and directed to inform the respective Governments to which they were accredited. I assumed therefore you had this notice.
The confusion evident in Calhoun's cable is not clarified by the archival record. Suffice it that on 13 February 1911, the Chinese Foreign Office had notified its ministers abroad that "It is now decided to hold the opening session of the Medical Congress for the investigation of plague at Moukden on the fifth day of the Chinese third moon (April 3). " 37 The experts who were to study the causes and prevention of plague thus found themselves delegates to a formal international conference whose start (never specified) was now "deferred" until the expected end of the epidemic.
The signals were indeed mixed. The Peking Daily News, meanwhile, reported on the forthcoming conference and commented that "In some quarters there exists a belief that the foreign experts are invited to take active part in anti-plague work. We fail to see where they received such false impression." 40 Strong was not easily deterred. Since he had been pressed to leave Manila hurriedly because of the urgent need in Manchuria, he felt justified in reaching Peking quickly and pushing on to Manchuria before the plague abated and the conference began. 41 When Minister Calhoun informed the Chinese of Strong's wishes, he learned that "The Foreign Office had changed its mind and has no objection at all to [Strong and Teague] proceeding at once. " 42 The Foreign Office telegraphed the viceroy at Mukden, and also Dr. Wu Lien-Teh, who was in charge of Chinese antiplague work in Manchuria, asking that every facility be accorded the Americans.
STRONG AT MUKDEN
Calhoun instructed Consul General Fisher at Mukden to introduce the Americans to Viceroy Hsi Liang "as sent by the American Red Cross . . . in response to [the] invitation of China," and that the Red Cross wished Strong to study actual cases before the Conference. 43 Strong, Teague, and the laboratory gear brought from Manila arrived in Mukden, the viceregal seat of Manchuria, on 28 February while plague still raged, and on 4 March Strong cabled the Red Cross that his laboratory was ready and he was treating patients. 44 Strong and Teague had also established living quarters and were using horses to get to and from work. Strong who was an avid horseman, said that these twenty minute rides provided the best transportation and "all the exercise necessary. " 45 Three small rooms, on the inner court of an old temple converted into a plague hospital, were turned over to Strong along with some basins and tables. Because there was no running water or gas, and the rooms were cold by day and subfreezing by night, many of Strong's bacteriological and pathological studies had to be completed later in Manila.
Patients in the wards lay side-by-side on a wooden platform, about two meters wide set along one wall, and they received little care beyond food and drink. Strong wrote that the sick were merely brought to the hospital to die, and the corpses were removed each morning to the morgue; indeed, the only patients who left the hospital were dead. So bad was the crowding and agonal disease that the floors and walls of the wards were spattered with bloody sputum, the hallmark of pneumonic plague. This represented a deadly hazard to hospital workers and to the occasional nonplague patient who was mistakenly admitted before bacteriologic sputum examinations became routine on admission. Because of the danger of transmission, Strong ordered that doctors and aides on the wards wear gowns, goggles, gloves, and special masks (Figure 2) , and "Although we worked on the wards each day until the end of the epidemic, and were often with patients for several hours continually . . . we remained entirely healthy. '
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Strong planned to investigate three aspects of plague: its treatment, transmission, and pathological anatomy. The medications he tried proved worthless; their nature is not mentioned except that all were administered intravenously. 47 Because patients died within a day or so of admission, some Chinese doctors became suspicious of Strong's treatments, and since the epidemic was slowing he decided to concentrate on the other two objectives. The transmission of bubonic plague by rat fleas, suggested in 1899 by Simond, had by 1909 been confirmed by the British Plague Commission in India, 48 but it was apparent that rats and their fleas were not involved in the Manchurian epidemic; indeed, the Plague Conference would hear that some fifty thousand rats had been examined without finding any infected, 49 and, according to an unpublished report from the Kuomintang, 170 thousand rats were examined ini9io-nin the Japanese zones, all negative. 50 Since the unresolved issue of transmission in Manchuria was paramount, Strong did studies in which he held culture plates at specified distances from the mouths of plague patients; he found positive cultures if the patients coughed but not if their breathing was normal or even dyspneic. 51 The masks Strong and others wore presumably intercepted droplets, but later experiments in Manila disclosed that the masks were permeable to sprayed bacteria. 52 Strong, apparently, was also concerned lest abrasions serve as portals of entry; according to Forbes, Strong "wore a beard because he didn't dare to shave." 53 According to Strong's confidential report to the secretary of state, missionary doctors at Mukden, who heard about Strong's plans to do autopsies, told him "that it would be quite impossible to perform autopsies in Manchuria, that these had never been permitted and that if we attempted them we merely would be mobbed, and that riots among the people would certainly occur. >>54 Strong reported, however, that when he and Teague were presented to the viceroy, Strong asked to study and treat plague victims in hospital, and to examine their bodies after death. Strong recorded that "The viceroy didn't state definitely that permission would be granted to us [for] autopsies. . . . However, he did not refuse to let us carry them on, and this was considered by us at the time as a satisfactory arrangement." Strong gambled on the viceroy's unspoken "permission," although he later acknowledged that autopsies were frequently difficult to obtain and the work was sometimes disrupted. In March, continued the report, the commissioner of foreign affairs advised Strong to discontinue autopsies because they had provoked popular discontent. A Mukden newspaper, quoted by Strong, commented on the autopsies: "The Chinese Government with praiseworthy promptitude, invited the best plague scientists to meet in this city, and now this must not be spoiled by any foolishness on the part of the people. ..." Soon after, the Chinese antiplague bureau sent Strong apologies and granted permission to continue autopsies, but only on unclaimed nameless bodies. 55 Strong completed twenty-five autopsies, the first, he said, ever performed in Mukden. 56 Whether or not Strong's were the first autopsies pales by comparison with his circumstances: "The examinations were sometimes performed under difficulties owing to the extreme cold. The water in the buckets would sometimes freeze while the necropsy was being performed, and the blood formed icicles as it flowed upon and over the edges of the table. " 57 These and related studies, many done in Manila, materially increased knowledge of the pathology of pneumonic plague. The results were published, within a year of Strong's leaving Manchuria, together with clinical observations, bacteriology, and experimental pathology, in a dozen papers by Strong and his colleagues. 58 "Strong's work on the pneumonic plague," wrote Governor Forbes in his journal, "was one of the most courageous and splendid bits of work that I know of. ... He is too modest to do himself justice." 59 Governor Forbes expressed his personal concerns in a letter to Strong at Mukden: "Please take every possible protection to avoid taking the plague. I hardly need tell you this but I hope you will get yourself vaccinated and for heaven sake take care of yourself. We need you here more than almost anybody. work was going on in the Russian and Japanese enclaves, and Strong received brief visits from members of the Russian, Japanese, and British delegations. 61 Before the conference opened on 3 April, the Chinese asked delegates to move to the newly decorated conference buildings. Strong complied, moving not only their personal quarters but also the laboratory, and work continued as time permitted until the conference closed on 28 April. Owing to this effort, Strong was able to report to the conference that tarbagans were in fact highly susceptible to experimentally induced plague. He used animals presented to him by the Chinese.
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Eleven countries were represented at the conference: the United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, and China; the official delegates numbered thirtythree, supported by nineteen deputies and staff. The codiscoverer in 1894 of the plague bacillus (now Yersiniapestis), Professor S. Kitasato of Japan, was the best-known delegate, although others would come away from the conference well known, notably Strong and Wu Lien-Teh, the chief Chinese delegate. ^ Kitasato had made some anti-Chinese remarks before leaving Japan for Mukden, but because of his fame he was asked to preside over part of the conference, while the thirty-year-old Wu held the major presidency. Based on its twenty-four sessions the conference generated eleven conclusions about the course and nature of the epidemic, and developed forty-five resolutions about the prevention and control of future outbreaks of pneumonic plague. Together these constituted the "interim report" presented to Sao Ke Alfred Sze, the Cornellschooled Imperial Commissioner, on the last day of the conference. 64 In acknowledging the delegates' productive work, Sze expressed pleasure at this the "first scientific conference that has been held in the Chinese Empire. . . .'
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Despite some underlying nationalistic frictions and antipathies, the conference, according to Strong The confusion and concern generated by the Manchurian plague were compounded when respected scientists weighed in with ill-conceived speculations. For example, the eminent French scientist, L. P. Simond, declared that the pest organisms in the blood of victims in Manchuria were transmitted person-to-person by human fleas, and that the epidemic subsided because the flea population declined. 68 There was, however, no epidemiologic basis for Simond's notion. A leading article in Lancet favored the infectious air-borne droplet to explain the spread of the pneumonic infection, 69 an idea some had earlier suggested 70 but without the direct evidence Strong would produce in Mukden.
The plague epidemic in Manchuria seemed to arise mysteriously and with frightening speed, leaving in its wake thousands of dead and extracting a cost to governments (mainly the Chinese) variously estimated at between eight million 71 and ioo million dollars. 72 It takes nothing from the credit owed Strong and the Plague Conference to notice that, while governments and newspapers publicized China's four-month ordeal with pneumonic plague, in the first quarter of 1911 flea-borne bubonic plague claimed some 280 thousand lives in British India, or five times the concurrent toll in Manchuria. 73 India's decade-long battle with plague, although reported upon in Lancet and the British Medical Journal, seems not to have captured the international imagination as did China's sudden and spectacular epidemic.
The New York Times and the London Times published frequent brief pieces about the Manchurian epidemic, and occasional feature-length articles that ranged from the near-lurid 74 to the candidly informative. 75 The newspapers occasionally mentioned Strong as the United States delegate to the conference, 76 but headlines declared that Nobel laureate Elie Metchnikoff, of the Pasteur Institute, had reassured the apprehensive French public that the plague would burn out before reaching the West: "the frightful mortality in Manchuria is, in fact, a safeguard for Europe. ' >77 The Manchurian plague even disrupted the social life of royalty, for the Germans canceled the Far Eastern tour of Crown Prince Frederick William who had been scheduled to visit Peking in February 1911. 78 A particularly interesting photograph, published in April 1911 in the New York Times, carried this instructive caption: "It shows a Russian soldier, having noted that the Chinaman is showing symptoms of the plague, arresting him, keeping him at a distance with the aid of a sword, and whistling for the sanitary officials to remove from the streets one who is a danger to all he approaches. Such scenes are common in Harbin." 79 Thus in modern times did swords and whistles join other antiplague measures during the worst epidemic of its kind in centuries.
STRONG RETURNS TO THE PHILIPPINES
At the end of the conference, Strong, who was chairman of the editorial committee, cabled Governor Forbes (with Sze's approval) for permission to have the Conference Report printed at the government Bureau of Printing in Manila. 80 When Forbes responded favorably, 81 Sze ordered 2,000 copies and thanked the Philippine Government for its aid. 82 Strong returned to Manila in May, 83 and Forbes described him as playing off his form in a polo match and "very pale from his tremendous labours in Manchuria. . . .' >84 Forbes was much impressed with Strong's bravery and accomplishments: "[The] achievements are ringing throughout the medical fraternity of the Far East. . . . We are all perfectly delighted to get him back." 85 On 19 October Strong wrote to Sze that' he had edited the Conference Report (nearly 500 pages in eventual print) and it was in press, 86 a considerable feat because Strong was also preparing to publish his own group of papers based on the Mukden researches. The printers had been authorized to bind twelve copies of the Conference Report in full leather and the rest in cloth or paper. Strong presented one of the leather-bound volumes to Forbes with an inscribed card and letter of thanks, to which Forbes responded: "I wish I could persuade myself that I had done more to make the thing possible and successful, but I am very much pleased to have the book and the inscription. You are, as always, the best of friends." 87 Strong's final months in the Philippines were troubled by illness and dispute. In July 1912 Governor Forbes cabled the Red Cross, through the Bureau of Insular Affairs, that "Owing to prolonged illness Richard P. Strong leaving Philippines eventually returning to US," 88 and Forbes also cabled the bureau to instruct Strong to "take plenty of time to get strong before undertaking work his life is too valuable to be risked"; 89 later in July, Strong himself alluded to "my illness. ' >9° Dean C. Worcester, the secretary of the interior (and Strong's ultimate boss), in a letter to Strong referred to "the unfortunate nervous condition to which you found yourself reduced as a result of severe and continued illness."
91 In September, Forbes mentioned "kidney trouble" that had impaired for a portable plague laboratory Strong ordered from Berlin for use in Mukden, leaving a balance of $277 (Strong to C. L. Magee, 29 June 1911, NA 898.53). The Red Cross asked Strong to store the field laboratory, and also to care for "the heavy underclothing which we presume will be of no use whatever in Manila . . " (G. W. Davis 107. Strong is described by those who knew him as personally bland and conventional, even to die extent of naming his polo ponies "Bobbie," "Thistle," and the like. His teammates, however, declared that "Autopsy," "Tourniquet," "Pleurisy," and "Calomel" were more appropriate names for the good doctor's mounts (W. C. Forbes, Journal 4: 225, 1911; and y. 81, 1912) .
108. Forbes to Strong, (n. 60). 109. Forbes to Lowell, (n. 93).
of Tropical Medicine. 117 Two years later Strong was appointed professor without limit of time, i.e., with tenure, perhaps because he had hinted to Dean Bradford that he might otherwise leave.
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Soon after he arrived at Harvard Strong led a major medical expedition to South America (bartonellosis), and another to wartime Serbia for the Red Cross Typhus Commission. Ten more expeditions to remote places followed during the next two decades, the extended trips usually producing noteworthy medical monographs. Strong also organized the International Red Cross Conference at Cannes (1919), from which the League of Red Cross Societies evolved. He saw active service with Harvey Cushing's Base Hospital #5 during World War I, and he returned to active duty as a colonel during World War II to teach tropical medicine at the Army Medical School in Washington.
Strong retired from Harvard in 1938 119 and died in July 1948 after a prolonged and painful illness, honored internationally by governments, ranking universities, and learned societies.
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AFTERWORD
The United States responded quite rapidly to China's request for expert aid during the epidemic, especially if one considers the number of agencies involved: the Departments of State and War, War's Bureau of Insular Affairs, the American Red Cross, and the Philippine Government. Potential bureaucratic bottlenecks were avoided, it would appear, because selecting a plague expert was handled at the highest levels, and the decision was made swiftly. Only four weeks after his selection Strong was already established in Mukden, no small feat considering the problems of distance, transportation, and the inevitable delays en route. It should also be noticed that the foreign experts, Strong included, did not come prefabricated to Manchuria since medical experience with pneumonic 120. Strong's distinguished career nearly ended in adversity before it was well started. In 1906 Strong inoculated some prisoners in Manila with an experrrunetal cholera vaccine mysteriously contaminated with plague organisms, and several of the recipients died. A description of tnis episode is in preparation (E. Chemin). Strong was deeply affected by the mishap, but it apparently did not taint his subsequent career. plague was limited by its comparative rarity in modern times; a few, however, Strong and Wu foremost among them, became expert by studying the disease on the ground during the Manchurian epidemic, and by debating issues at the conference that followed.
The epidemic was not without its positive consequences. In a remarkably prescient statement about the Manchurian plague, officials of the (British) Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, declared: "That good will come out of the evil we are well-assured. This epidemic will be the medical salvation of North China. It is the last straw to break the back of ancient quackery. . . . After this scourge is over Western medicine and sanitary methods will have a new birth." 121 Out of China's plague did come changes that began to modernize its medicine and public health. For example, autopsies, instructional dissection, and cremation were all institutionalized. More important, and a direct outgrowth of the conference, was the establishment by the Chinese of the (North) Manchurian Plague Prevention Service, headed by Wu LienTeh; 122 this highly successful agency was the first organized element of a public health service in China. The Manchurian epidemic, together with American-inspired health-related developments in China, 123 may also have influenced the nascent Rockefeller Foundation then entering the China scene. The Foundation's 1914 Medical Commission to China 124 took "encouragement" from the Mukden Conference's recommendations, choosing to concentrate first, however, on basic medical education because trained men were lacking both for public health work 125 and for a proposed medical research institute. 126 
